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Abstract— The government’s estimate for toll road concession award, as a comparator for investors’ bids, has been criticized by 
investors, as it does not fully include the proper cost of risks. Thus, there is a need to develop a more equitable estimate that considers 
the risks, both at the project and at the business/corporate level. The study was mainly supported by qualitative data on the 
probability of occurrences and impact assessment of risks, acquired through interviews with major investors. Probability Impact 
Matrices were used to identify risks categorized as “high risks.” Findings have indicated that the high and dominant risks are: i) 
Route/traffic management (lower traffic volume due to changing routes); ii) Overloading (poorly imposing the limitations of heavy 
vehicles); and iii) Inadequate/inaccurate data in feasibility study documents. Recommendation on the mitigation plan for these risks 
has been corroborated by both parties, the government, and the investors. Parts of the risk are proposed to be incorporated into the 
government’s estimate, while other risks should be adequately addressed in specific contract clauses for Indonesia’s PPP scheme. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia has been through many obstacles in fulfilling 
infrastructure needs. One of them is funding for 
infrastructure. National Planning Agency has calculated the 
funding that is needed for infrastructure from 2010 to 2014 
reaching Rp 2.000 trillion; meanwhile, the ability of the 
government in term of the state budget is only around Rp 
600 trillion [1]. Alternative funding that can be used for this 
problem is the Public Private Partnership (PPP) scheme. 
To support the Public Private Partnership (PPP) in road 
infrastructure, the government has formulated various 
regulations. However, it is still deemed essential to prepare a 
guideline for investment appraisal (private deal) in toll road 
concession tender. Several studies related to challenges in 
developing toll road describes that the inhibiting factors to 
the operation toll road system performance were a legal 
framework (regulatory), institutional frameworks [2], and 
lack of optimal preparation from the government in 
preparing a PPP project [3]. The other challenges are related 
to the design and implementation of concession contracts 
that allocate risks, responsibilities, and the mechanisms for 
evaluating and awarding projects [4].  
In Indonesia, to evaluate business proposals of the toll 
road (toll road investment), the government constructs an 
evaluation benchmark called the government’s estimate for 
toll road concession award (HPSPJT). HPSPJT is an owner 
estimate that includes documents and attachments. It is used 
to support evaluation of business (investment) proposal for 
toll road concessions by the procurement committee. 
HPSPJT is also a tool used to assess reasonable investment 
prices for toll road concession which is formulated and 
established before the bidding process is started. Further 
HPSPJT becomes a benchmark for private deals. 
Based on the regulation of the Ministry of Public Works 
No.13/ PRT/ M/ 2010, the committee shall draw up HPSPJT 
which is then approved by the minister or the head of 
Indonesia Toll Road Authority (BPJT). The component of 
HPSPJT at the least consists of (a) forecast of investment 
estimate; (b) construction cost; (c) land acquisition cost; (d) 
technical planning and supervision cost; (e) projected traffic 
volume, (f) toll rate including adjustment and toll revenue, 
(g) forecasts of operation and management cost; (h) 
projected profit/loss; (i) cash flow projections; (j) calculation 
of adequacy ratio for loan repayments; (k) calculation of 
NPV (Net Present Value), IRR (Internal Rate of Return), 
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Profitability Index, and Payback Period; (l) tables showing 
the planning of  total investment cost; (m) the initial toll rate; 
and (n) concession period [5]. 
Optimal risk allocation is the main goal of all the PPP 
scheme, where the value of risk needs to be included in the 
bidding cost (estimation) document [6]. Thus, not only does 
owner estimation calculate the direct and indirect cost, but 
PPP scheme also needs to include the risk management (risk 
allocation sharing). To alleviate the risk, structured and 
specified actions are important to be planned, and 
cooperation with authorized parties is required [7]. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHODS 
To achieve the objectives of this study, the method of 
research was carried out in four stages:  
1. Identification of risk: a) referring to the paper/previous 
studies, and b) in HPSPJT component, tender, bid and 
contract documents (concession agreement). 
2. Risk Analysis (to identify high/significant risks). 
3. Interviews with investors about risk mitigation that 
could be recommended in the HPSPJT.  
4. Recommendations: which one to be included in the 
HPSPJT and which one not to be included in the 
improvement of contract clauses. 
A study to identify risks in PPP toll road in Indonesia has 
been described [8]. These risks study was based on previous 
studies as in [9], [10], and [11]. The identification of these 
risk is described in Table 1. 
 
TABLE I 
RISK IDENTIFICATION FOR PPP TOLL ROAD [9] 
 
Risk Event Code 
Literature Interview 
(2012-
2013) 
Widiantono 
2003 
Winarsa 
2005 
Naimah 
2009 
I  Pre – Construction      
Tender      
1. Lack of transparency in the tender process R1 x    
2. Inadequate tender documents R2 x   x 
3. Inaccurate data for a feasibility study  R3 x   x 
4. Changes in the scope of work by owner (design and volume) R4 x x   
5. Low competition R5    x 
6. Length of time for the tender process R6    x 
Land Acquisition      
1. Uncertain time for land acquisition R7 x  x x 
2. Uncertain price for land acquisition R8 x  x x 
Concession Contract (PPJT)      
1. Incomplete contract (related to risk arrangement) R9    x 
2. Concession period R10    x 
II  Construction      
Financing      
1. Error in construction cost estimation  R11 x  x  
2. discontinuous funding/difficulty in obtaining bank loans  R12 x x x  
3. Interest rate uncertainty (significant changes in loan interest rate)  R13 x x x x 
4. Changes in currency exchange rates  R14 x x   
5. Payment to subcontractors in a timely manner R15  x   
Construction      
1. Unforeseen condition R16 x    
2. Severe weather R17 x x   
3. Loss of material or logistic risk (theft)  R18 x    
4. Contractor’s experience R19  x   
5. Poor quality of construction (does not meet the criteria of the 
specification) R20 x    
6. Labor strike R21 x   x 
7. Risk of construction delay R22 x x x x 
8. Subcontractor’s ability R23  x   
9. Material price escalation due to inflation and cost escalation  R24 x   x 
10. Uncertainty in the procurement of imported equipment  R25 x    
11. Poor performance of equipment  R26 x x   
12. Inappropriate construction method R27  x   
Force majeure      
1. Natural disasters in project regions R28 x  x  
2. Political changes (lead to demands for nationalization of projects 
owned by foreigners). R29 x    
3. Vandalism (destruction of property) R30 x  x  
Legal Aspect      
1. Lack of legal support for investors R31    x 
2. Changes in government policy R32  x  x 
III  Post – Construction      
Risk of Operation and Maintenance Cost      
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1. Ineffective and inefficient in operation and maintenance R33 x    
2. Construction defects  R34 x  x  
3. Escalation cost for operational and maintenance due to inaccurate 
estimation  R35 x   x 
4. Risk of high traffic accidents R36 x    
5. Disruption of toll road operations due to the demonstration R37 x x  x 
6. Overloading risk R38    x 
Risk of Toll Revenue      
1. Inaccurate traffic volume estimation R39 x x x x 
2. Determination of initial tariff and tariff adjustment mechanism R40 x x x x 
3. Business risks (competitive routes) R41 x    
4. Corruption, collusion and nepotism R42 x    
Risk of Force Majeure      
1. Natural disasters in project regions R43 x  x  
2. Political changes (lead to demands for nationalization of projects 
owned by foreigners). R44 x    
3. Vandalism (destruction of property) R45 x  x  
 
Table 1 shows that there are 45 risks have been identified 
(literature based). The dominant risk occurring in pre-
construction phase is land acquisition. It is related to the 
uncertainty of time and price of the land acquisition, become 
a scourge to the investor as well [12]. According to 
government’s regulation No. 2/2012 about Land Acquisition 
for Development of Public Interest, and Presidential 
Regulation No. 71/2012 on Implementation of Land 
Acquisition for Development of Public Interest, the risk of 
land acquisition becomes an exception in this research.  
In the construction phase, the dominant risks are financing 
and construction risks. And in post-construction phase, the 
dominant risk is income or toll revenue. It is related to 
inaccurate traffic volume estimation, determination of initial 
tariff and tariff adjustment mechanism, and market 
conditions as well [13]. 
Risks identification in Table 1 is further analyzed to 
screen and set risk priority based on investors/ 
concessionaires’ perspectives. The risks priority is the risk 
that includes in high-risk classification. This classification 
conducted by using a probability impact matrix. First, a 
rating scale must be set to determine the magnitude of 
probability and impact. This research has used 1 to 5 scales 
in Table 2 [14]. 
 
TABLE II 
RISK ASSESSMENT SCALA [14] 
 
Probability Impact 
Scale Description Scale Description Cost Schedule Quality 
1  Very low 
(Rare)  
 
very unlikely/very 
rare. Probability less 
than 0.02 
(< 0.02) 
1  Insignificant Budget estimates not 
exceed (funds are 
sufficient). 
Slight schedule 
change from target 
quality decreases slightly 
but still usable (minimal 
or unimportant 
performance impacts) 
minor impact, can be safely ignored 
2  Low occasionally/likely 
to occur. Probability  
0.02-0.1 
2  Minor Project cost estimates 
exceed budget by 1-5% 
Minor slip in the 
project schedule 
Fail to fulfill promises to 
stakeholders  
small impact on the cost, time and quality (a small reduction in performance)  
3  Medium Possible, enough. 
Probability 0.1-0.5 
3  Moderate Project cost estimates 
increase by 5-10% 
Small slip in schedule 
(delay) impacts 
stakeholders 
Some functions cannot 
be used 
moderate impact on the cost, time and quality  
4  High Often occur/likely. 
Probability 0.5-0.8 
4  Major Project cost estimates 
increase by 10-20% 
Fail to fulfill  
Deadline 
Fail to fulfill the needs 
of many stakeholders 
Substantial  impact on the cost, time and quality  
5  Very High almost certain/very 
often Probability 
over 0.8 (> 0.8) 
 
5  Catastrophic Project cost estimates 
increase  by more than 
20%. (need substantial 
additional funding) 
Large slip in project 
schedule (delay) 
harms the project.  
The project is ineffective 
and useless  
Threatened the success of the project   
 
A qualitative method was used in this research. It means 
the analysis based on experts’ opinions. These opinions were 
acquired through direct surveys and interviews. The experts 
who became respondents were practitioners of investments 
(private sector). They are  Investors of a toll road that their 
business entities engaged in toll road concession (BUJT). 
Totally there are five respondents in this study, i.e., BPJT, 
BUJT A, B, C, and ATI. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Risk Analysis in Toll Road  
When the survey was conducted, there were two new 
risks identified from the respondent's opinion. They are (i) 
political, social and security risks, and (ii) risk of the 
uncontrolled environment along the toll road. The result of 
risks assessment in risk matrix can be seen in Fig. 1. 
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Risk Matrix of BPJT 
 
Risk Matrix of BUJT A 
 
Risk Matrix of BUJT B Risk Matrix of BUJT C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Matrix of ATI 
Fig. 1 Risk Matrix 
 
Based on Fig. 1, the risks are grouped into (i) low-risk, 
can be accepted or ignored, (ii) moderate risk, has the high 
possibility but low effect, or preferably, (iii) high risk, has 
high probability and severe impact. The focus of this study is 
a high-risk category that could give great effects to PPP toll 
road.  
1) Risk-based on BPJT and BUJT Perceptions: Overall, 
there are 26 risks that belong to the high-risk category based 
on BPJT and BUJT. Furthermore, these risks will be 
grouped into dominant risk and main risk by weighing 
(percentage) the number of respondents' answer (Fig. 2). 
Fig. 2 shows that there are 13 dominant risks experienced 
by BPJT and BUJT (> 50% of respondents experienced it). 
They are: (i) overloading risk, (ii) risk of construction delay, 
(iii) discontinuous funding/difficulty in obtaining bank loans, 
(iv) business risks (competitive routes), (v) determination of 
initial tariff and tariff adjustment mechanism, (vi) inaccurate 
traffic volume estimation, (vii) risk of high traffic accidents, 
(viii) changes in government policy, (ix) poor quality of 
construction (does not meet the criteria of the specification), 
(x) interest rate uncertainty (significant changes in loan 
interest rates), (xi) incomplete contract (related to risk 
arrangement), (xii) changes in the scope of work by owner  
(design and volume), and (xii) Inaccurate data for feasibility 
study.  
All of the 13 dominant risks are interconnected, but they 
cannot be merged as one because of different impacts. The 
major risks in the dominant risks are (a) overloading risk 
(100%), (b) risk of construction delay (80%), (c) 
discontinuous funding/difficulty in obtaining bank loans 
(80%). 
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Fig. 2 Category of dominant risks based on BPJT and BUJT perception 
 
2) Risks Based On BUJT Perception: There are 25 high 
risks based on BUJT perception (Fig. 3), and only eight (8) 
risks as dominant risks (> 50% of respondents experienced 
it). They are: (a) overloading risk, (b) business risks 
(competitive routes, (c) changes in government policy, (d) 
risk of construction delay, (e) discontinuous 
funding/difficulty in obtaining bank loans, (f) Incomplete 
contract (related to risk arrangement), (g) changes in the 
scope of work by owner  (design and volume), and (h) 
Inaccurate data for feasibility study. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
Fig. 3 Category of dominant risks based on BUJT perception 
 
The dominant risks based on BUJT perception (Fig. 3) 
show that overloading risk is a major risk (100%). The other 
seven (7) items (75%) are also dominant risks. Business 
risks (competitive routes) and inaccurate data for feasibility 
study have been selected as the other main risks. The reason 
is that these two risks could affect the occurrence of another 
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risk and give bad influences to the investment feasibility. 
Additionally, these risks are relevant in today’s concession 
situation and often occur during the execution of toll road 
infrastructure projects. 
These three main risks (overloading risk, business risks, 
and inaccurate data for a feasibility study) will be 
recommended to be included in HPSPJT. An examination 
should be first conducted to document HPSPJT, auction, 
bidding and PPJT documents. The purpose is to avoid 
overlapping risk allocations and to screen the possibility of 
where these three main risks could be included in the 
HPSPJT. 
B. Risk Identification in HPSPJT Component, Tender, Bid 
and Contract Documents (Concession Agreement) 
The second interview has been conducted to respondents 
from the government and investor groups to dig the fair 
mitigation of both two parties. The result shows that 
practically respondents have considered and included all 
HPSPJT components in the owner estimate (OE) of the 
investment proposal. It was conducted by adding a 
percentage for values of risk in OE components, but the risk 
details cannot be described by the respondents. The 
magnitude calculation of risks monetary values will also 
vary for each BUJT. It depends on the company's 
experience, type of project, and ability to manage and 
allocate the cost of these risks occur.  
An examination of various bidding documents of BUJT 
shows that they generally have not included risk factors in 
detail yet. The reason is that including the risk costs in a 
bidding document can cause a higher bidding price, which 
can lead to a loss in the bidding process. The cost escalation 
and contingencies item which initially deemed cover risks do 
not represent one of the major risks based on the BUJT 
perception. An examination of the contract documents 
(concession agreement) also shows that the risk cost has not 
been accommodated in it yet. Hitherto, contract documents 
have only arranged risks related to law changes. 
The result of the main risk examinations in the HPSPJT, 
tender, bidding and contract documents shows that the main 
risks are not calculated and included in the cost projection of 
toll road investment. This condition is deemed unfair when 
dealing with the main risks that might potentially arise in the 
toll road concession, consequently burdening the BUJT. The 
improper risk allocation between BUJT and the government 
becomes the main concern. It influences investors’ interest 
to invest in Indonesia’s toll road. Thus, it is highly 
recommended that these three main risks (based on BUJT 
standpoint) be included in the HPSPJT. 
C. Mitigation of Main Risks 
1) Business Risks (Competitive Routes): This risk is 
greatly influenced by the government policy, and 
consequently it should be regulated clearly in the contract 
regarding responsibilities of each party. Business risk related 
to competitive network/routes of transportation can be 
proposed to be set in the contract clause which clearly details 
that the government would not build a competitor path 
before the BEP period. It should also mention the granting of 
subsidies or compensation (Viability Gap Funding) [15] or 
other forms that could be approved by both parties as a fair 
risk allocation form. 
2) Overloading: Overloading risk is assessed as the most 
possible risk to be recommended in the HPSPJT (can be 
evaluated quantitatively). The proposal has offered two 
possibilities: 
• To include it in point (g) of the HPSPJT component, by 
adding in the operation cost forecast and management 
for toll roads. 
• To include it in point (e) of the HPSPJT component, 
that is traffic volume projection, by adding the phrase 
“traffic overload”. Thus, sentence (e) becomes “traffic 
volume projection and traffic overload”. 
 
Between two options, it would be better if the clause is 
included in point (g) of the HPSPJT component as the cost 
of overloading risk occurs during the operation and 
maintenance. The implementation is by inserting 
“overloading” in one of O and M cost items in the BUJT 
investment proposals. 
3) Inaccurate Data for Feasibility Study: This risk could 
be recommended in the HPSPJT or be regulated in the 
contract. It is because this risk could be evaluated 
quantitatively and elaborated in the business plan calculation. 
The recommendation is inserting point (d) costs of technical 
planning and supervision in the HPSPJT. The costs 
calculated in point (d) are the costs incurred by the BUJT 
related to the feasibility study work. Another option is 
included in the contract (concession agreement). It can be 
conducted by setting out clearly in the contract clause. 
TABLE III 
RECOMMENDATION FOR MAIN  RISKS 
 
No. Risks Recommendation 
1. Business risks 
(competitive routes) be regulated by contract 
2. Overloading be included in point (g) of HPSPJT 
component that is costs estimation for 
operation and toll roads management 
3. Inaccurate data for 
feasibility 
- be included in point (g) of HPSPJT 
component, that is costs of technical 
planning and supervision. 
- be regulated by contract 
 
The risks that mentioned in Table 3 are the output of this 
study: the overloading risk and inaccurate data for feasibility 
are recommended to be calculated and included in the 
HPSPJT component as those risks can be quantified in the 
cost. The business risks (competitive routes), meanwhile, is 
regulated in the PPJT contract (contract agreement) as it is 
related to the government policy hence difficult to quantify. 
Although this study has not recommended business risks be 
added to the HPSPJT component yet, it is expected that in 
the near future the government could examine the possibility 
for these risks to be quantified and included in the HPSPJT 
component. This business risk (consider referred as traffic 
risk) will influence the toll revenue [13]. By taking action to 
mitigate and allocate risk should reduce the risk of project 
failure. 
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D. Recent Developments in PPP Regulations 
The data were mainly collected in late 2013. The 
regulation effective during that period was the Presidential 
Regulation No.67/2005. In March 2015, a new Presidential 
Regulation (PR) No.38/2015 was issued. This new 
regulation replaced the previous Presidential Regulation 
No.67/2005 which was amended the last time by Presidential 
Regulation No.66/2013. 
In conjunction with Presidential Regulation [16], there are 
two more regulations issued, i.e., the Ministry of National 
Development Planning Regulation (Permen PPN) No.4/2015 
and Regulation of the Procurement Agency for 
Goods/Services (Perka LKPP) No.19/2015. Permen PPN 
No.4/2015 includes the mechanism of implementation of 
cooperation between government and business entities in the 
provision of infrastructure [17], while Perka LKPP 
No.19/2015 generally regulates the procedures for 
procurement and selection of the enterprises that will handle 
the cooperation between the government and the business 
entities of the infrastructure project [18]. 
In relation to risks, the old regulation only regulates the 
principle of risk allocation which suggests that risk is given 
to the party most able to control the risk [19]. Meanwhile, in 
the new regulation (No.38/2015), more detailed guidelines 
related to risks is provided. It includes the mechanism for 
risk control and management into the principle of 
cooperation between the government and enterprises. The 
provision of infrastructure is carried out with risk assessment, 
development of management strategy, and risk mitigation. 
Technically, risk identification, mitigation recommendations, 
and risk allocation are conducted on pre-feasibility study 
phase [16]. Furthermore, the result of the feasibility study 
would plausibly serve as the basis for preparing the 
contract/cooperation agreement. 
In Permen PPN No.4/2015 also mentioned that the risk 
assessment should be conducted in the initial pre-feasibility 
study phase. That Permen describes that risk assessment/risk 
analysis is conducted by (1) risk identification; (2) 
measuring risk category/level; (3) determining risk 
allocation; and (4) developing risk mitigation. The risks to 
be examined are those of legal and market risks [17]. 
The states risk allocation matrix is required as one of the 
documents provided on the request for proposal (RFP). The 
procedure for procurement and selection of the business 
entities on PPP infrastructure projects now includes the 
development of risk allocation matrix, which was 
comprehensively described in this paper.  
Thus, this study suggests the methodology and the results 
of estimate considering proper risk based on investors’ 
perspective. While it was developed before the new 
regulations (Perpres, Permen, and Perka) were published, the 
methodology is highly relevant, as discussed above. 
A recent interview with the head of Indonesia Toll Road 
Authority (BPJT) reveals that  improvement efforts have 
been continuously conducted, i. e., the tender process have 
been accelerated and integrated (better planning and 
coordinating), and providing more varieties of PPP schemes 
which suited to varied project conditions. The government 
has also been more open to provide guarantees/support for 
project financing by issuing a regulation by the ministry of 
finance [15], [20] and taking real actions in the effective 
land acquisition by providing land payback guarantee. While 
there are still found some lack in the implementation of PPP 
scheme, but generally the government has been putting more 
efforts in assuring better collaborations with all stakeholders. 
The effort such as formulated the key success factors for the 
infrastructure programme, for example, real coordinated 
improvement in bureaucracy, streamlining and 
improvements to the land acquisition process, etc. [21]. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The needs for having toll roads are essential, but many 
risks faced by investors become an obstacle in building toll 
roads. The investors also perceive that there has been less 
than optimal risk allocation and compensation that provide 
guarantees and ease to invest in Indonesia. Overall, this 
study has concluded that there are three main risks in the 
concession of Indonesian toll roads: overloading, inaccurate 
data for feasibility, and business risks (competitive routes). 
The results of mitigation for these three main risks finally 
become a recommendation for consideration by BPJT. They 
are: (i) overloading risk to be included in point (g) of 
HPSPJT component, “costs estimation for operation and toll 
roads management”, (ii) inaccurate data for feasibility to be 
included in point (d) of HPSPJT component, “costs of 
technical planning and supervision, and (iii) business risks 
(competitive routes) to be regulated in contract clause, but 
not in HPSPJT due to government policies. 
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